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Abstract 
Policy makers are increasingly concerned about the effect of taxes on foreign direct investment (FDI). This study 
shows that for U.S. multinationals – in line with the findings of the majority of previous studies – a reduction in host 
country tax rates corresponds with higher FDI-stock. The estimated elasticity suggests that a 1% reduction in host 
country tax rates leads to an increase of total FDI between 0.3% and 1.8%, depending on the specific tax burden 
indicator. In addition, it is shown that tax elasticity is lower when solely analyzing investments in production, plant and 
equipment (PPE). Since the latter approximates more closely the concept of real capital than total FDI stock, this 
indicates that inter-country competition for real capital is less intense. Finally, the tax coefficient declines and is 
sometimes insignificant when excluding tax havens from the empirical analysis. 
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An ongoing debate concerns whether corporate taxes matter for FDI. This paper contributes 
to the existing empirical literature in four directions. First, using FDI data from U.S. MNEs 
the present paper shows that tax rates matter for attracting FDI. However, in contrast to 
previous studies, which focussed on smaller sets of countries, this paper analyzes FDI 
stocks for up to 100 countries. Second, since FDI data largely also comprises financial 
capital, this paper distinguishes between investments in production, plant and equipment 
(PPE) and total assets. The former is more closely related to the concept of real capital, 
since total assets also include financial capital investments of multinationals. With the 
exceptions of Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994), the majority of papers 
do not distinguish between PPE and total assets. The paper shows that the tax elasticity of 
PPE is significantly lower than that of total FDI stocks. This result is in line with 
conventional wisdom suggesting that highly mobile assets behave more elastically towards 
taxation than less mobile parts of a MNE. Third, with the sole exception of Grubert and 
Mutti (2000), no previous study has attempted to examine the sensitivity of the results to 
the inclusion of tax havens. Tax havens are countries or territories offering low regulation 
standards, strict bank secrecy laws and favorable tax treatment to business or financial 
investments. The analysis shows that tax elasticity of FDI is high only as long as tax havens 
are included. Restricting the sample to non-tax havens weakens taxation’s effect on FDI 
stocks, and sometimes leaves it insignificant. This suggests that MNEs reallocate especially 
mobile input factors into tax havens, whereas FDI location decisions among non-tax havens 
follow to a lesser extent tax considerations. Finally, the paper utilizes a broader set of tax 
burden indicators than most studies, which rely only on statutory corporate tax rates.   
The paper is organized as follows: after a short overview of the existing empirical literature 
in the next section, the data and the methodology are discussed in section 3 and the results 
of the empirical analysis are presented in section 4. The final section briefly concludes. 
2. Relation to Existing Literature
FDI generally refers to investments undertaken by MNEs in foreign countries. Some 
authors believe however, that PPE is a more adequate indicator for investments in real 
capital (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2008; Hines and Rice, 1994). Unlike total FDI stock, PPE 
does not include financial assets, intangible goods or advertising expenditures. Although 
these factors might be important input factors for MNEs, they may be even more often used 
to shift profits out of high tax countries. Since it is especially difficult to find comparable 
transactions for intangible goods, manipulating transfer prices of these goods is an 
important   strategy   to   shift   profits   (among   others   Clausing,   2003;   Grubert,   2003). 
Alternatively, MNEs might shift profits by financing subsidiaries in high tax locations with 
excessive debt (among others: Desai et. al., 2004a; Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2005). Thus, 
the tax responsiveness of PPE should be lower compared to the total stock, because the 
latter also includes more mobile assets than PPE.                 
Many studies have investigated the effect of taxes on the distribution of FDI, with the 
majority of studies finding a negative effect (for a comprehensive review of these studies 
see de Mooij and Ederveen, 2008;  Hines, 1999). The consensus emerging from this 
literature is that 1% reduction in host country tax rates increases FDI stock abroad by 
roughly 0.6% (Hines, 1999). The first study investigating the relationship between taxes 
and PPE is from Grubert and Mutti (1991). Employing a cross-section analysis to U.S 
MNEs in 33 countries, they show that a reduction of the host country tax rate by 1% 
increases investment in PPE by 1.5. Whereas Grubert and Mutti’s (1991) sample is 2
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restricted to manufacturing firms, Hines and Rice (1994) explore the tax-induced behavior 
of all majority-owned non-bank U.S. affiliates. Similar to Grubert and Mutti (1991), the 
cross-section analysis is undertaken with data for 1982, but includes a larger set of 
countries. Hines and Rice (1994) report elasticities between -3.3 and -6.6, which are much 
larger than those identified by Grubert and Mutti. However, it is not clear whether the 
higher elasticities in their study are due to their inclusion of more business sectors or 
extending the country sample to tax havens.
Although a number of authors have analyzed PPE investments, there remains no systematic 
work on the relationship between total assets and PPE. The only studies that analyze 
whether investment in PPE reacts less sensitively to taxation than the total stock are de 
Mooij and Ederveen’s (2003; 2008) meta-analyses. In their earlier study, the authors do not 
find a statistically significant relationship in their meta-regressions. However, in their 
update, MNEs react more sensitively with respect to PPE. One interpretation of this 
surprising result might be that FDI often consists of a change in ownership, whereas PPE 
reflects largely greenfield investments (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2008, p. 694). However, as 
almost all PPE studies refer only to U.S. cases, it is difficult to make a more general claim 
for this interpretation since U.S. MNEs may behave particularly sensitively to taxation. 
Additionally, the magnitude of the tax coefficient in FDI regressions may not only depend 
on the specific FDI indicator, but also on the inclusion of tax havens. Except Grubert and 
Mutti (2000), no study has discussed the role of (country) sample selection when analyzing 
FDI stock distributions. Grubert and Mutti (2000) analyze more than 500 U.S. MNEs 
investing in 60 countries. When excluding countries with a tax rate below 7.5%, reported 
elasticity declines marginally, whilst the negative relationship between taxes and FDI still 
holds. 
                   
3. Data and Method 
As the last section showed, many authors focused their research on the distribution of total 
FDI due to data shortcomings. The present empirical analysis instead distinguishes between 
U.S. MNEs’s total assets and their PPE investments. Since the tax competition literature 
suggests that an MNE’s more mobile components behave more sensitively to taxation the 
following relationship should hold:
Hypothesis 1: PPE tax elasticity is lower than total asset tax elasticity.
Since the mixed results regarding the effect of taxes on the distribution of FDI across 
countries might also depend on which countries are included, this study tests whether the 
inclusion of tax havens alters the results for U.S. multinationals. Since there are limits to a 
“race to the bottom”, especially in developed countries, the following relationship should 
exist:
Hypothesis 2: Tax elasticity is lower when tax havens are excluded from analysis.     
In our study, a country is classified as a tax haven when it appears on Dharmapala’s (2008) 
updated version of Hines and Rice’s (1994) list. An alternative would be a threshold value 
on the tax burden (see for example Grubert and Mutti 2000) and exclude countries below 
this tax rate. Since tax rate thresholds of 10% and 15% found relatively similar results, we 
present only the results for the Dharmapala list in the empirical section.
1  
1 As a third alternative, one might use the Dharmapala list of tax havens directly. This approach yields similar 
results, but has the disadvantage that tax elasticity can no longer be estimated, since tax havens are excluded 3
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Data for the dependent variables is provided by the “Bureau of Economic Analysis” 
(BEA). The annual survey of direct investment abroad is the most comprehensive source 
on U.S. MNE activities and provides detailed financial and operating statistics about their 
affiliates. Coverage is almost complete.
2 Data is available for roughly 100 countries for the 
cross-section analysis in 2000. The dataset contains all majority-owned non-bank affiliates 
of U.S. MNEs. The appendix lists the countries included in the empirical analysis. Tax 
havens are marked by an asterisk. 
The empirical analysis controls for variables found to be important in standard gravity 
models (for applications to FDI see: Büttner 2002; Davies et al. 2008). The dependent 
variable is either PPE or total assets employed in the respective country. Suppressing 
country indices, the following model provides the starting point for the empirical analysis:
Log (FDI) = β0 + β1 Log (Distance) + β2  Common Language + β3  Log (Labor Cost) + 
β4 Log (Sales/Worker) + β5  Log (Political Instability) + β6 Log (GDP) + β7 Log (Trade 
Restrictions) + β8 Log (Development Level) + β9 Log (Monetary Conditions) + β10 Log 
(Taxation) + ε                                                                                                                       (1)
                                  
Other factors than taxes might also be relevant for FDI. First, we employ a measure of the 
distance between Washington, D.C. and the destination country’s own capital city to 
control for transport costs. Data comes from CEPII. Second, since transaction costs may 
not only involve transport costs, a dummy indicating whether the host country shares the 
same language is included in the equation. The dummy’s coefficient should be positive as 
long as cultural proximity promotes FDI. 
Third, MNEs might invest more capital in countries with favourable labor market 
conditions. Therefore, the average wage per employed worker is used to control for 
differences in labor market conditions. U.S. MNE labor costs are defined as employee 
compensation divided by the number of employees. Data is from the BEA. However, 
MNEs do not only seek cheap labor. The labor force must also be qualified to produce 
quality goods. Therefore, fourth, we include sales per foreign employee as a variable to 
capture differences in labor force productivity. 
Fifth, a political instability indicator measuring the likelihood of conflicts and violence is 
used to control for variations in investment risk for different countries (Janeba, 2000). The 
data originates from the World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann  et al., 2007). 
Higher scores indicate politically more stable countries. 
Sixth, besides cost factor differences, locational advantages might also arise from market 
penetration. The market size of a country is proxied by its GDP, using the Pennworld 
Tables as the data source (Heston et al., 2009). 
Seventh, FDI might be a substitute for trade between countries. If countries have extensive 
trade restrictions, the incentive of MNEs to use FDI to circumvent these restrictions might 
increase. However, we would expect the opposite relationship where the country offers an 
export platform to the MNE. Therefore, the sign of the relationship is unclear. We include 
an indicator measuring the amount of trade restrictions, where higher scores indicate more 
restrictions. Eighth, we control for monetary conditions. The indicator comprises a 
weighted three-year inflation rate and price controls in the economy. Data on trade 
restrictions and monetary conditions are from the Heritage Foundation. Ninth, we control 
for the development level using data from the World Bank.    
Finally, taxes contribute to capital deployment in foreign countries. However, no consensus 
appears in the literature as to which indicator is appropriate. Many studies used statutory 
from the regression. Results are available upon request. 
2 For a more detailed discussion see Desai et al. (2006).4
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tax rates because they are easily available. This is justifiable because MNEs would likely 
also rely on easily available indicators. Additionally, narrow tax bases offer no protection 
from outward profit-shifting, while lower statutory tax rates do. Even if the base were 
extremely narrow, any remaining taxable profit would risk being located offshore if 
domestic rates exceed foreign rates (Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000). Thus, the nominal tax 
rate will serve as the first tax burden indicator. Data is taken from KPMG Tax Notes and 
complemented by information from the Office of Tax Policy Research from the University 
of Michigan and the corporate tax guide from Ernst & Young. We use data for the year 
1999.   
Nevertheless, the tax treatment of cross border investment is a complex issue. Nominal tax 
rates neglect key tax system features. Therefore, as a second alternative, we use an 
effective average tax rate (EATR). Data for this tax rate comes from Djankov et al. (2009). 
The EATR is calculated by country tax experts of PricewaterhouseCoopers and refers to an 
investment horizon over five years. Assumptions about the pre-tax rate of return and 
financing are identical across countries. The disadvantage of this measure is that it refers to 
the year 2003. However, since we analyze FDI stocks, which are more stable than FDI 
flows, this is not very important. A second disadvantage of such a model-based (or 
theoretical) indicator is that it neglects many real world details, such as special tax regimes. 
Due to these pros and cons, we also use an effective empirical tax rate (ETR) as a third 
alternative. Unlike the nominal tax rate and in more detail than the EATR, the ETR 
accounts for the impact of depreciation allowances and different rules regarding the carry 
over of losses.
3 Additionally, the ETR is a more accurate indicator for countries that offer 
large special tax holidays towards MNEs. For example, Luxembourg has a nominal tax rate 
of 30%, which stands at odds with the general conception of the country as a tax haven. 
However, the 1.7% ETR of US-MNEs in Luxembourg shows that Luxembourg instead 
offers large tax holidays to MNEs, allowing it to maintain a 30% nominal tax rate and 
compete with other tax havens. U.S. MNEs’ ETR is calculated by dividing paid taxes in the 
respective country by the pre-tax profit of the affiliates. Data is provided by the BEA. 
Unfortunately, ETR can only be calculated for 55 countries, leaving fewer observations for 
empirical analysis. In addition, empirical tax ratios are more likely to be endogenous than 
theoretical measures. Note that all tax burden indicators refer to corporate profits (and in 
some countries wealth taxes). We therefore assume that consumption taxes are not borne 
by MNEs.
4    
Regarding the setting of tax rates, the tax competition literature suggests that political 
decision makers respond to increasing capital mobility by cutting taxes (Zodrow and 
Miezskowski, 1986). Thus, the relationship between tax burden indicators and dependent 
variables might appear to be endogenous. Following previous empirical studies, the 
logarithm of country population is used as an instrument.
5 Recent empirical work focussing 
on tax competition between highly developed countries confirms the view that small 
countries in particular set low tax rates (Winner 2005). Additionally, as demonstrated by 
3 Both the ETR and EATR do not consider host-home country interactions. Thus, the impact of different 
taxation regimes (credit, exemption or deduction) and withholding taxes is neglected. However, if MNEs are 
not constrained by specific organizational aspects, they will choose to repatriate to the country with the lowest 
tax costs (on this point see Grubert, 1998).
4 This implies that consumption taxes on input goods are not passed through. Alternatively, the MNE could 
pass through consumption taxes to the final consumer. Empirical evidence in favor of this assumption is 
provided by the recent study of Büttner and Wamser (2009), which shows that consumption taxes do not 
robustly influence the location of German FDI. 
5 We use population size to make our results more comparable with previous studies, which often used this 
measure as an instrument. This is not unproblematic, since the effect of market size may not fully captured by 
a country’s GDP. However, when using only population density as an instrument, the tax coefficients lose 
significance but the basic conclusions, i.e. that assets are more responsive to taxation, is not altered. Results 
are available upon request.      5
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Kanbur and Keen (1993) with respect to population density, tax havens are usually 
countries with high density. We use both measures for our first-stage regressions, shown 
together with the OLS results in the next section.
4. Results   
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the tax havens and non-tax havens. Tax 
havens are typically less populated: On average tax havens have 2 million inhabitants. 
Comparing FDI stock distribution, we see tax havens receive more FDI than non-tax 
havens. Additionally, PPE investment constitutes only a small fraction of total assets for 
tax havens, but a larger share of PPE on total assets for the non-tax havens.
Comparing tax burden indicators shows that both the ETR and EATR are below the 
nominal tax rate. This is unsurprising because the ETR and the EATR take the tax base into 
account. In all cases, the tax burden is substantially lower in tax havens. The tax burden 
indicators are also highly correlated with each other.
6  Finally, tax havens offer higher 
(gross) salaries and are, on average, more politically stable countries. This descriptive 
impression is in line with recent evidence on the formation of tax havens (Dharmapala and 
Hines, 2009). This is because, besides low taxes, tax havens must also offer a sound 
investment climate; otherwise, investors would prefer to locate capital in more stable 
countries.             
Table 2 shows the results for the first stage regressions. Using an F-value of 10 as a rule of 
thumb, the first stage regressions perform quite well and show similar values for all tax 
burden indicators. In line with theory, a population increase of 1% increases the respective 
country’s tax burden by roughly 0.4%. Corporate taxes are also lower in countries with a 
high population density.     
Table three provides the results for U.S. MNEs in the second-stage regressions. The model 
explains roughly between 65% and 80% of variance on the dependent variables. Regardless 
of the FDI measure, there are regional differences reflecting the impact of transport costs. 
The results suggest that a 1% increase in distance between the U.S.A. and the destination 
country reduces FDI by roughly 0.5%. Cultural proximity measured by the language 
dummy is also important for the location of U.S. FDI abroad. 
Regarding other control variables, the results suggest that market penetration is the most 
important determinant for FDI. Countries with large markets receive significantly more 
FDI. The results for labor market conditions are less clear. The labor cost variable does not 
significantly relate to the location of assets or PPE, but our measure of differences in 
productivity levels (sales per worker) is sometimes significant and suggests that MNEs 
search for productive labor. 
When analyzing the tax variables, we see that every indicator is at least weakly significant. 
The range of the coefficients lies between -0.3 and -1.0 for total assets, which includes the 
“consensus”   elasticity   of   -0.6  found   in   previous   empirical   research   (Hines,   1999). 
According to hypothesis 1, there should be large differences between elasticities for 
different definitions of foreign activity. Yet the tax coefficients are always at least two 
times higher for total assets than PPE. We used a t-test to identify whether the regression 
coefficients for PPE and total assets differ significantly. The results support the hypothesis 
that tax elasticity for PPE investment is significantly lower. For example, column two of 
table two indicates that a 1% increase of the nominal tax rate in the host country 
corresponds with a 0.5% reduction of total assets, whereas PPE is reduced by only 0.3%. 
The empirical pattern remains similar under the ETR or the theoretical indicator based on 
6 The correlation coefficient of the nominal tax rate with the ETR and the EATR is 0.57 and 0.96 respectively, 
and the correlation of the ETR with the EATR is 0.59.  6
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national tax codes. Overall, high taxes exhibit a deterring effect on the deployment of U.S. 
MNE investment abroad, although the effects are less pronounced when PPE is used as a 
measure of U.S. MNE foreign activity. 
Table 4 shows the results when we use our predicted values from the first-step regressions. 
As indicated by the Hausman test, there are no significant differences between our OLS 
regressions and the instrumented values. Generally, the results are similar to those of table 
3. The nominal tax rate, perhaps the most accurate indicator of when MNEs decide to shift 
profits, is somewhat more significant than the other tax burden indicators, and the results 
again show that taxes are not very important for explaining when MNEs decide on the 
location of PPE. In sum, PPE appears to react less sensitively to taxation than total assets.
These results may be driven by the inclusion of tax havens. Table 5 shows some results 
when tax havens are excluded from analysis. As can be seen, tax elasticity is reduced, 
especially when the focus of the analysis is on U.S. MNEs’ assets.
7 Thus, the conflicting 
results of previous research may be partly explained by their inclusion or exclusion of these 
countries. The more tax havens are part of the empirical analysis, the larger the effect of 
corporate taxes on FDI. This result might explain why Hines and Rice (1994) found 
elasticities far larger than those of Grubert and Mutti (1991).
8 Additionally, it is worth 
noting that the nominal tax rate becomes especially insignificant, whereas the coefficients 
are still weakly significant under the ETR. Because nominal tax rates are crucial for profit 
shifting, the results indirectly indicate that tax havens might especially gain from profit 
shifting vis-a-vis industrialized countries.  
5. Conclusion
This paper has shown that taxes matter for the distribution of U.S. FDI regardless of the 
specific tax burden indicator. Two results have to be kept in mind when considering the 
relationship between FDI and taxes. First, the tax burden is only one factor determining 
real capital investment. Second, countries are especially able to attract large amounts of 
FDI when their tax rate is substantially below the average rate. This result might explain 
the mixed evidence for taxes and FDI so far because, as the present paper showed, the 
country sample matters when analyzing the relationship between taxes and FDI. 
Although the paper has shown that the tax elasticity of FDI depends on the country sample 
and specific indicator of outward investment, important questions remain. From a macro 
perspective, it remains unclear whether tax havens definitely cause revenue losses in 
industrialized countries; they might mitigate tax competition under particular circumstances 
(Dhamaphala, 2008) or even promote investment in developed countries (Desai  et al., 
2004b). From a microeconomic perspective, it would be interesting to investigate whether 
MNEs with operations in tax havens respond differently to taxation than those investing 
7 An alternative to excluding the tax havens would be to let the inverse of the tax rate enter the regression 
equation, which is what Grubert and Mutti (1991) chose to do, for example. Such a nonlinear relationship is 
justifiable since MNEs might place a disproportionate share of taxable income in tax havens. Other 
approaches for letting the tax rate enter the equation nonlinearly include estimating location decisions via 
probit/logit models (on this issue see for example Büttner and Ruf, 2007).   
8 The same analysis was undertaken for a smaller subset of countries with more disaggregated data for 
mining, manufacturing, wholesale trade and the financial sector. Using industry-specific data shows that the 
basic conclusion, i.e. that PPE reacts less elastically towards taxes than assets, still holds. However, some 
heterogeneity was observed on the tax-coefficients. In the case of mining companies, the tax coefficient 
sometimes had a positive sign, which may indicate that governments can tax location-specific rents in 
resource-rich countries. Generally, financial companies have the highest tax responsiveness, indicating that 
tax elasticity differs between service and manufacturing sectors. Therefore, the differences between Grubert 
and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) may also be partly explained by differences of sector coverage. 
Results for these disaggregated regressions are available upon request.   7
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only in non-tax havens. Given MNE heterogeneity, different opportunities to avoid taxation 
might cause different tax elasticities in their non-tax haven locations.         8
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Appendix 1: Country List
Canada   Dominican Republic            Bulgaria  Ethiopia 
Austria UK Caribbean Islands* Croatia  Kenya 
Belgium Bermuda* Cyprus* Morocco 
Czech Republic Egypt Estonia  Zambia 
Denmark South Africa Kazakhstan Zimbabwe 
Finland Israel            Latvia  Malta*
France Saudi Arabia Liechtenstein* Lebanon*  
Germany  Australia Lithuania  UAE
Greece China Romania  Bahrain*
Hungary Hong Kong* Ukraine  Oman 
Ireland* India Uzbekistan Quatar 
Italy  Indonesia            Bolivia  Yemen 
Luxembourg*  Japan            Paraguay  Bangladesh 
Netherlands South Korea            El Salvador Pakistan 
Norway Malaysia            Guatemala Papa Neuginea  
Poland  New Zealand            Nicaragua  Sri Lanka 
Portugal  Philippine                                Senegal   Namibia 
Spain  Singapore*            Bahamas* Uruguay
Sweden Taiwan            Haiti Slovenia
Switzerland* Thailand            Jamaica   Slovakia
Turkey  Peru            Netherlands A.* Gibraltar*
UK Venezuela            St, Lucia* 
Argentina Costa Rica            Trinidad
Brazil Honduras            Belize*
Chile Mexico            Dominica*
Colombia Panama*            Cameroon   
Ecuador Barbados*     Liberia* 
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Non-Tax Havens Tax Havens
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Assets (USA)
a 33881 136323 36365 57013
PPE (USA) 5219 15529 1865 3104
Population 53.2
b 154 1.95 2.39
ETR 31.4% 14.1 6.3% 2.89
Nominal Tax Rate 33.1% 13.4 16.7% 14.5
EATR 20.0% 5.9 9.0% 8.4
Political Stability 0.20 0.93 0.86 0.58
Trade Restrictions 3.22 1.18 2.12 1.36
Development Level 2.30 1.49 3.83 1.25
Monetary Conditions 3.02 1.51 1.41 0.62
Sales 19786 58487 13739 27523
Wage Income per Worker 23.34 16.45 33.32 17.7
Notes: a= calculations based on data in 2000; b = million habitants 
Table II: First Stage Regressions 




































































Nobs 100 76 54
F-test 15.53 (0.000)***
b 17.24 (0.000)*** 17.47 (0.000)***
Adj. R
2 40.5 63.0 55.1
a= t-values; b= p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* means significance on the 1%,5%-and 10%-level.10
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Table III: Determinants of Total Assets and PPE of U.S. MNEs
1 2 3 4 5 6
































































































































2 0.771 0.732 0.815 0.677 0.806 0.740
Nobs 100 100 54 54 76 76
Notes: a= t-values in parentheses. ***,**,* means significance on the 1%,5%-and 10%-level. b= p-
values, testing the null that the tax coefficients are identical in the regression for assets and PPE.11
11
Table IV: Determinants of Total Assets and PPE of U.S. MNEs: 2SLS
1 2 3 4 5 6











































































































































2 0.632 0.697 0.815 0.675 0.783 0.730
Nobs 100 100 54 54 76 76
Notes: a= t-values in parentheses. ***,**,* means significance on the 1%,5%-and 10%-level. 12
12
Table V: Results without Tax Havens 
1 2 3 4 5 6
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS









































































































































2 0.841 0.783 0.843 0.734 0.851 0.801
N 82 82 44 44 63 63
Notes: a= t-values in parentheses. ***,**,* means significance on the 1%,5%-and 10%-level.13
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